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NOTES
NEW YORK HEART BILLS: PRESUMPTIONS
GOVERNING POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS'
CARDIAC DISABILITIES
I. Introduction
Statutes commonly referred to as heart bills have been enacted in
many states to create a presumption that heart disease suffered by a
police officer or firefighter resulted from employment.' Such laws
facilitate the payment of disability benefits under police and firefighter pension plans, 2 but they have been challenged on the ground
1. The purpose of Heart Bill legislation was to create the dual presumption of
line-of-duty and accident causation. Sen. John Marchi, Chairman, New York State
Senate Cities Committee: Statement regarding legislative intent of the City Heart
Bill, June 8, 1979, before Senate membership. Unpublished Transcript, pp. 4990-91
(Debate over re-enactment of the City Heart Bill, 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 321) [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
2. "Accident" disability payments, for purposes of retirement or death benefits,
are greater than payments categorized as retirement for "ordinary" disability or
"ordinary" death benefits. A firefighter's medical examination for retirement on
ordinary disability must show
that such member is physically or mentally incapacitated for the perform-.
ance of duty and ought to be retired. If such medical examination shows
that such member is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of duty and ought to be retired, the medical board shall so report and
the board shall retire such member for ordinary disability ...
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, § B19-7.83 (1976). See also § B18-42.0 (police).
Ordinary death benefits for firefighters are received by their estate "[u]pon the death
of a member who has not completed the period of service, as elected by him for
retirement, or upon the death of a former member . . ." Id. § B19-7.79. See also §
B18-38.0 (police). Retirement allowances for police and firemen equal three-fourths
of their final compensation for accidental disability or death. Id. § B19-7.89 (fire), §
B18-47.0(3) (police). Ordinary disability benefits are awarded in addition to accumulated pension contributions. They amount to one-third of a member's salary at
date of retirement if he has under ten years of service. Id. § B19-7.88 (fire), §
B18-46.0 (police); one-half of his salary for service of ten to twenty years. Id. For
service of at least twenty years, the member is entitled to one-fortieth of his final
compensation multiplied by the number of years of service. Id. This amount must
exceed one-half his final compensation. Id. Members with at least twenty-five years
service receive retirement allowances of one-fiftieth of their final compensation
multiplied by their total years in service, an amount which also must exceed one-half
the final compensation. Id. Municipal pensions are not subject to state and local
taxes. Id. § B19-7.94 (fire), § B18-52.0 (police). However, ordinary disability pensions (1/2) are subject to federal taxes, while accidental disability pensions (3/4) are
not. Rev. Rul. 45, 1972 - 1 C.B. 34; NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § B18-52.0
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that medical evidence does not fully support such a presumption, 3 and

(1976). A police officer or firefighter seeking Heart Bill benefits must apply through
the Fire Department or Police Department Pension Fund Boards. NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE § B19-2.0 (fire), § B18-13.0(a) (police) (1976). The Police Department's
Board consists of union representatives with six votes and city representatives with six
votes. Id. § B18-13.0(a). Id. § B19-2.0(a) (fire department with double number of
votes but same union-city distribution). Seven-twelfths of the votes authorized to be
cast are needed to confer benefits. Id. § B19-2.0(b) (fire), § B18-13.0(b) (police).
A Medical Board consisting of three physicians is appointed for both the Police
Department, id. § B18-20.0, and the Fire Department, id. § B19-7.18. One physician
on each Medical Board is appointed by the appropriate Pension Board. The Commissioner of Hospitals appoints another physician. The Police Department's remaining
physician is appointed by the city's Director of Personnel, while the Chief Medical
Examiner for the city's Civil Service Commission appoints the third member of the
Fire Department's Board. Each Medical Board arranges and passes upon all medical
examinations, investigates all essential statements and certifications by or on behalf
of a member in connection with the application for disability retirement, and reports
to the appropriate Pension Board on its conclusions and recommendations.
Several steps are followed by a fire or police employee who seeks accident disability for a heart condition. Police Department procedures will be used as an example.
(a) The officer files a form, including the relevant details of his case, with the New
York City Police Department Pension Section, which then processes it. (b) When an
officer applies for accident disability payments, the Police Commissioner, in a parallel action, applies to the Medical Board for a "Commissioner's Disability" for either
ordinary or accident benefits, allowing the Medical Board to make the decision about
the officer's disability. (c) Staff of the Chief Surgeon's Office, which administers the
work of the Police Pension Board, receives the completed form. (d) The Medical
Board calls the officer to a meeting of its members where the primary issue is whether
the officer is disabled. Approximately 95% of the "heart" cases are atherosclerosis
(thickening and hardening of the walls of the arteries) or ischemic heart diseases
(developing when coronary circulation is insufficient to supply oxygen demands of
the myocardium). See notes 60, 61 infra and accompanying text. The Board may
have the officer undergo one or more of three tests: a stress test; a Thallium Scan (use
of radioisotopic substance to detect decreased blood flow); or a cardiac catheterization angiogram (surgical procedure in which dye is injected directly into heart and/or
coronary vessels to determine areas of obstruction of blood flow). After considering
the officer's evidence, the Board decides whether or not to award accident benefits.
(e) The Board's decision is forwarded to the Police Pension Board of Trustees, which
meets once a month. While the Medical Board's finding of disability is conclusive, its
determination regarding causation may, under certain conditions, be overruled by
the Board of Trustees. Meschino v. Lowery, 31 N.Y.2d 772, 290 N.E.2d 825, 338
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1972). Interview in New York City with James J. Dwyer, N.Y.C.
Finance Commissioner's representative to Police and Fire Department Pension
Boards (August 28, 1981).
As a result of a 1945 case, City of New York v. Schoeck, 294 N.Y. 559, 63 N.E.2d
104 (1945), a deadlock vote at a Pension Board of Trustees meeting would relegate
the applicant to ordinary disability or death benefits. For a discussion of Schoeck, see
note 105 infra. Schoeck would later serve as one of the bases for the 1979 litigation
involving the Heart Bill, where it was asserted that city trustees attempted to deadlock Pension Boards of Trustees meetings from March through July, 1979. The result
would have been to retire applicants with lesser (ordinary) disability pension benefits, and then force these applicants to utilize other legal resources by obtaining a
writ of mandamus or declaratory judgment through an Article 78 proceeding. N.Y.
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that they impose unnecessary costs on municipal and state govern4
ments .
In New York, two statutes govern heart disease suffered by police
officers and firefighters-one covering New York City (City Heart
Bill), 5 the other covering New York State (State Heart Bill) .6 Both
bills establish a line-of-duty presumption which provides that any
impairment of health caused by diseases of the heart and the resulting
disability or death are presumptive evidence that the impairment was
job connected, unless proven otherwise. 7 In addition, the State Heart
Civ. Prec. Art. 78 (McKinney 1981). Schoeck would have mandated the court to
treat the Board's decision with greater judicial deference, thereby effecting the same
result had the Board originally denied the application. Brief for Respondents at 18,
Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938,
438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). When union representatives on both boards refused to
attend meetings to prevent a quorum, the city brought a mandamus proceeding to
compel their attendance. The unions also sued the city, seeking a declaration by the
court of the proper meaning of N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-k (McKinney Supp.
1980-81). On appeal to the appellate division, all of the suits were consolidated. See
generally notes 101-03 infra and accompanying text.
3. A number of physicians have given testimony to the effect that there is little
basis for specialized heart legislation for police officers or firefighters. See notes
23-30, 100 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
5. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-k (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
6. N.Y. R'riiuE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 363-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
7. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-k subdiv. a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81) provides in
part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law or
administrative code to the contrary, but except for the purposes of sections
two hundred seven-a and two hundred seven-c of this chapter, the workmen's compensation law and the labor law, any condition of impairment
of health caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in total or partial
disability or death to a paid member of the uniformed force of a paid
police department or fire department, where such paid policemen or
firemen are drawn from competitive civil service lists, who successfully
passed a physical examination on entry into the service of such respective
department, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such
condition, shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.
Although the statute does not specify applicability to New York City by identifying
coverage of "certain cities," virtually no court or administrative decision has applied
its provisions to any other city. But see Kieper v. Fitzgibbons, 91 Misc. 2d 1067, 399
N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1977) (applied N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §
207-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81) in conjunction with § 207-k for no apparent reason). This is presumably because New York City police officers and firefighters do
have their own pension system, while their colleagues in other cities are included in
the New York State Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement System. Regarding payment of salary, wages and medical and hospital expenses incurred in the performance
of duties, § 207-a and § 207-c would apply to non-N.Y.C. police officers and
firefighters since New York is the only municipality with greater than one million
people. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 207-a, 207-c (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
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Bill contains an explicit rebuttable accident presumption which ap-

plies only to police officers, 8 and enables payment of accident disabil-

ity benefits unless it is shown that the injury was not accidental.
While the City Heart Bill has no explicit presumption, a rebuttable
accident presumption has been implied by courts and pension administrators.9
This Note analyzes the history and current status of New York's two
heart bills, with particular emphasis on the City Heart Bill. The
judicial and legislative background of the bills as well as comparable
laws in other jurisdictions are discussed in Section Two. The most
recent court decisions construing the New York heart bills, including
Uniformed FirefightersAss'n, Local 94 v. Beekman,1 0 are examined in
Section Three. Finally, Section Four analyzes the effect of judicial
interpretations of the City Heart Bill and assesses various alternatives
available to the city.

The State Hearti Bill, N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 363-a (McKinney Supp.
1980-81), provides'in part:
1. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter or of any general, special
or local law to the contrary, any condition of impairment of health caused
by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a fireman shall
be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and
discharge of duty and the natural and proximate result of an accident,
unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.
2. Notwithstanding any provisions of this chapter or of any general,
special or local law to the contrary, any condition of impairment of health
caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a policeman, presently employed, and who shall have sustained such disability
while so employed, shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in
the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by
competent evidence.
This section originally provided that a cardiac condition found in either a policeman
or fireman was presumed to be an accident. In 1973 the statute was amended to
extend to both job-relatedness and accidental causation. 1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 1046, §
30. In 1974, the statute was again amended to provide the dual presumption for
firemen while maintaining only one presumption for police officers-that the condition was job-related. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 967.
8. N.Y. RE~rRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 363-a (2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). See note
7 supra.
9. Line-of-duty, or job connection, is presumed under both statutes. This means
that an injury resulted from. and was attributable to one's employment. The "accident" presumption is not mentioned in the city statute, but has been incorporated by
judicial and administrative interpretation. See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
Both presumptions are difficult to rebut because the cause of a heart problem is far
more elusive than, for example, the cause of a broken leg or other external injury
which occurs as the result of a specific occurrence during the course of employment.
10. 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981).
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II. Historical Background
Heart bills are based on certain assumptions concerning the work
performed by police and firefighters, including the existence of stressgenerating factors, risks faced in their regular duties, and the range of
possible effects of these duties on their health." It took twenty-two

11. In describing the hazards of an urban police officer, one proponent of the
N.Y.C. Heart Bill has pointed to the accumulation of incidents which, as a whole,
supposedly contribute to accidental heart injury. Such factors might include "a
shot-gun blast just short of fatal; a knife-thrust missing by an inch of a vital organ; a
chase on foot up a pitci black stairway or down a dark alley and over a wall; a pistol
in the hand of aipotential assassin which misfires ... such is the common life pattern
of the police officer on duty." Brief for Petitioners-Respondents at 8, DeMilia v.
McGuire, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981), quoting Sergeant Harold Melnick, President of the N.Y.C. Police Dep't Sergeants Benevolent
Ass'n. Such heart conditions presumably affect police officers and firefighters in both
large urban areas, see, e.g., Margiasso v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 910, 410 N.Y.S.2d 909
(3d Dep't 1978) (Syracuse); Cunningham v. Levitt, 40 A.D.2d 915, 337 N.Y.S.2d 684
(3d Dep't 1972) (Port Authority Police Dep't); and smaller municipalities and suburban communities throughout the state, see, e.g., Tremblay v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 901,
410 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1978) (Lockport); Nolan v. Comptroller, 59 A.D.2d 799,
398 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't 1977) (Village of So. Nyack); Acciavatti v. Levitt, 57
A.D.2d 131, 393 N.Y.S.2d 613 (3d Dep't 1977) (Eastchester).
Issues relating to statutory construction that arise under the New York State
statutes have been litigated in other jurisdictions as well. Thirty-eight states have
adopted legislation similar in effect to New York's Heart Bills. See, e.g., Alabama:
ALA. CODE §§

11-43-144(b), 36-30-22 (1977); California:CAL.

GOV'T CODE §

31720.5

(West Supp. 1981); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-30-508 (1977); Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-433(a) (West 1972); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
112.18, 185.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974-80); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 781017(b) (Supp. 1981); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 94 (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1973). There are several types of statutes, most of which have been litigated in
favor of those employees seeking worker's compensation for heart benefits. See, e.g.,
Bussa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 259 Cal. App. 2d 261, 66 Cal. Rptr.
204 (1968); Schave v. Department of State Police, 58 Mich. App. 178, 227 N.W.2d
278 (1975); Commonwealth v. Oil City, 15 Pa. Cmwlth. 544, 328 A.2d 170 (1974);
Page v. City of Richmond, 218 Va. 844, 241 S.E.2d 775 (1978); Sperbeck v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 46 Wis. 2d 282, 174 N.W.2d 546 (1970).
Most states are covered by worker's compensation. In New York City, however,
worker's compensation does not apply. For a discussion of the coverage by worker's
compensation of heart related injuries, see generally lB A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 41.72 (1980 & Supp. 1981); Davis, Workmen's Compensation
in Connecticut - The Necessary Work Connection, 7 CONN. L. REV. 199 (1975);
Milner, Heart DiseaseDue to OccupationalEmotional Stress: A Compensable Claim
Under Oregon Worker's Compensation Law? 10 ENVT'L LAW 159 (1979); Note,
Heart Injuries Under Worker's Compensation: Medical and Legal Consideration, 14
SUFFOLK L. REV. 1365 (1980). Virtually every state incorporates a presumption of
service connection when heart conditions result from the performance of active duty.
In many of the states, the presumption cannot be rebutted merely by evidence of
preexisting heart disease nor by medical opinion that the occupation had no effect on
the weakened heart. 1B A. LARSON, supra § 41.72(a). The type of employee covered
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years, however, for police and fire unions to convince the state legislature and the governor to pass these bills. Until they were finally
enacted in 1969 and 1970, heart bills had been repeatedly vetoed by
New York State governors. 2 Despite similarities between the City
Heart Bill and the State Heart Bill, there are several significant distinctions in both the language of the legislation and the case law
3
which has arisen since their enactment.'

by a Heart Bill varies among the states. While most bills apply to only uniformed
employees of paid fire and police departments, a few extend coverage to employees
such as corrections, custodial, public works, buildings police, and certain airport
personnel, or special tax district firemen and port authority firemen. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 112.18 (West Supp. 1974-80) (special firemen); MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch.
32, § 94 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973) (special peace officers). But see Saal v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. App. 3d 291, 123 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1975)
(statute did not cover California State University policemen); State Compensation
Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 251 Cal. App. 2d 772, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 760 (1967) (court refused to extend benefits of full-time salaried deputy sheriff
to include a deputy coroner who was also a deputy sheriff). Many states require a
minimum amount of service time before allowing heart-related disability payments.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-144(b), 36-30-22 (1977) (three years); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 31720.5 (West Supp. 1981) (five years); GA. CODE ANN. § 78-1017(b) (Supp.
1981) (five years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1081/2, § 6-151.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82)
(ten years). A related issue is the type of heart trouble covered by the statute.
Through statute and case law, some Heart Bills have included hypertension under
the definition of heart trouble, Muznick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd.,
51 Cal. App. 3d 622, 124 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975), but not cerebral vascular stroke,
Coyne v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. App. 3d 770, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 373 (1977), or a firefighter's cardiac neurosis, Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971). Few statutes discuss
the provision of benefits in terms of "risk factors." Such factors may include cigarette
smoking, drinking, or being overweight. Letter from Harvey G. Kemp, Jr., M.D.,
Director, Division of Cardiology, St. Luke's Hospital, to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D.,
N.Y.C. Commissioner of Health (April 12, 1979). At least two states disallow payment of the fire or police employee's disability pension if it results from excessive use
of alcohol or prohibited drugs. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 78-1017(b)(Supp. 1981)
("no benefits shall be payable . . . for any disability resulting from the chronic and
excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages, or addiction to [illegal] drugs .... ");
accord, COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-30-508 (1977). Under most statutes, the employee
upon entry must pass a physical examination which does not reveal any evidence of
heart problems or pre-existing cardiac diseases. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 36-30-22,
11-43-144(b) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-433(a) (West 1972); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 112.18, 185.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974-80); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 94
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1973).
12. Proposals similar to the City and State Heart Bills were put forth in the years
1948-1952, 1955, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1966 and 1968, but none were passed.
Letter from Jacob Spatz, State of New York Office for Local Government, to Robert
R. Douglass, Counsel to the Governor (May 14, 1970), Governor's Bill Jacket, 1970,
A. 610.
13. For a discussion of the differences between and objections to these Heart Bills,
see notes 23-43 infra and accompanying text.
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A. Statutory Analysis
1. New York City's Heart Bill
The City Heart Bill has repeatedly passed both legislative houses
since its enactment in 1970.14 The bill was re-enacted in 1974 as part
5
of omnibus legislation covering several other retirement provisions.'
The inclusion of the City Heart Bill in a legislative package ensured its
passage, a tactic which was also used successfully in 1979 despite the
city's concerted lobbying efforts.'
The New York State Senate extended both bills for a two-year period in June, 1981.17
The effect of the City Heart Bill has been to facilitate the collection
of accident disability pensions by police officers and firefighters considerably higher than ordinary disability payments. 1 8 The bill does
this in two ways: it creates one rebuttable presumption that any heart
condition was caused by a member's job' 9 and another rebuttable
presumption, as interpreted by the New York pension administrators
and courts, that the heart condition was an accident. 20 The dual
presumption represents a departure from pre-heart bill practice. Before the bill was enacted, New York City police officers and firefighters had to prove a specific connection between their injury and performance of their police or firefighting duties, and that the injury
resulted from a single, discrete accident. 21 The bill has been inter14. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
15. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 510.
16. 1979 N.Y. Laws, ch. 321.
17. The City Heart Bill was originally enacted for one year (1970 N.Y. Laws ch.
805), and was re-enacted from year to year until 1979, when it was renewed for a
two-year period (1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 321, § 6). The State Bill, added in 1969 (1969
N.Y. Laws ch. 1103, § 1), was renewed annually for one-year periods. Both bills
were extended for another two years in omnibus legislation, S. 7001, (A. 8976)
proposed and passed in June, 1981. The bill amends the Retirement & Social Security
Law in relation to the negotiation of retirement benefits, the extension of temporary
benefits, continuation of pension supplementation, and the coordinated escalation
plan. It also amends 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 625, § 6 relating to extension of temporary
retirement rights and benefits and suspends certain provisions of 1976 N.Y. Laws ch.
890 relating to a deferred compensation plan. See also Transcript, supra note 1, at
4919-94.
18. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
19. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 22, 75, 76, infra and accompanying text.
21. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § B19-7.84 (1976) (firemen), provides in part
that a member applying for accident disability shall state that he is physically or
mentally incapacitated for performance of city service as a natural and proximate
result of city service; that the disability was not the result of his own willful negligence, and that the disability was the natural and proximate cause of an accidental
injury received while a member of city service. The same language is incorporated
into NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § B18-43.0 (1976) (police officers' retirement for
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preted to mean that any heart injury incurred was accidental, in
addition to the assumption that it was incurred in the line of duty.
Explicit language concerning the line-of-duty presumption is found in
the statute and provides that any disease of the heart "shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty."' 22 No such language relating to an accident presumption is contained in the statute, however, and courts have relied
instead on legislative intent and public policy.
There have been several arguments raised against enactment 23 and
re-enactment 2 4 of the bill. Perhaps the most persuasive of these is the
position that a heart bill is not supported by medical evidence linking
heart conditions to police or firefighting work. 25 A prominent heart

accident disability) and § B18-39.0 (accidental death benefits). When the New York
City Police and Fire Pension Funds were created in 1940, New York, N.Y., [1940],

N.Y. Local Laws (No. 2)

(NEW YORK,

N.Y.,

ADMIN. CODE §§

B18-48.0(c), B19-7.9(c)

(1976)), the legislature adopted the New York City Employees Retirement System
(NYCERS) and the state system rules requiring separate proof of accidental causation, in addition to job-relatedness. NYCERS, created in 1920, allowed a member to
retire with extraordinary disability benefits if he could demonstrate that he was
"physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of city service as a natural
and proximate result of such city service..." (1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 427, § 1714). It
was amended in 1923 to require the showing of an accident to qualify for extraordinary death or disability benefits (1923 N.Y. Laws ch. 142, §§ 6, 8). In 1924, the
N.Y.S. Retirement System adopted the same provision as described above (1924 N.Y.
Laws ch. 619). When the 1940 legislation was established for N.Y.C. Police and Fire
members, both the NYCERS and state system requirements of proof of accident
causation were considered applicable to New York City. Brady v. City of New York,
22 N.Y.2d 601, 241 N.E.2d 236, 294 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1968); accord, Drayson v. Board
of Trustees, 37 A.D.2d 378, 326 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1st Dep't 1971), afj'd, 32 N.Y.2d 852,
299 N.E.2d 684, 346 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1973); DeSio v. Codd, N.Y.L.J., October 22,
1974, at 19, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); McPartland v. Board of Trustees of the
Police Pension Fund, N.Y.L.J., December 14, 1978, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County).
22. The State Heart Bill, however, has provided explicitly for a dual rebuttable
presumption of line-of-duty and accident. See note 7 supra. A 1974 amendment to
the State Bill deleted this accident provision for police officers, 1974 N.Y. Laws ch.
967, while the presumption remained unchanged for firefighters. Id. Opponents of
the City Heart Bill have pointed to State Heart Bill cases as representing what the
city's bill should have been. They assert that the presumptions of the State Bill are
identical to that of the city. Brief for Appellants at 29, DeMilia v. McGuire, 52
N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). The unions supporting the
City Heart Bill have maintained that its directive is to prevail over any provision of
law or administrative code, see note 7 supra. Brief for Petitioners-Respondents at 26,
DeMilia v. McGuire, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). See
also notes 75, 76 in]ra (obviating the need to prove a specific, discrete "accidental"
event).
23. See, e.g., Governor's Bill Jacket, 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 508.
24. See, e.g., Governor's Bill Jacket, 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 321.
25. See also note 100 infra and accompanying text.
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surgeon has said that "the precise etiology of arteriosclerosis or atherosclerosis remains undetermined. ' 26 Another heart specialist suggested that if the city sought to take responsibility for any heart
ailment which affects a police officer or fireman, then it "should be
equally responsible for cancer, stroke or practically any other illness. "27 One study showed that rates of cardiovascular disease and
mortality have been approximately the same or lower for police officers and firemen, compared with the public at large. 28 No clear
relationship has been established between stress and the onset of disease, and there has been no proven correlation between the occupations of police or firefighting and the predilection to heart disease. 29
Finally, while acknowledging the widespread acceptance of the statute, a prominent doctor noted that although it is easy to "be persuaded emotionally that everything should be done for these individuals who are at highest risk in our city," it may be time for
''re-examination of the quality of the data upon which a diagnosis and
subsequent compensation hinges." 3
A second criticism of the City Heart Bill is that it mandates by
statute what has not been achieved through the collective bargaining
process. 31 The Mayor's Office of Labor Relations advised in 1970
that the device of statutory intervention to establish pension benefits
applicable to public employees "contravenes the basic public policy of
the legislature as reflected by the 'Taylor Law,' which encourages
public employers and designated representatives of their employees to
bargain collectively with respect to wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment, including pension benefits." 32 For example, legislation enacted in 1979 referred to as the "Lung Bill" 3 3 was

26. Letter from Michael E. DeBakey, M.D., Baylor College of Medicine, Dep't of
Surgery, to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C. Comm'r of Health (April 28, 1979).
27. Letter from Denton A. Cooley, M.D., Cardiovascular Ass'n, Texas Heart
Institute, to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C. Comm'r of Health (April 10, 1979).
28. Memorandum from Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C. Comm'r of Health, to
Allen Schwartz, Corporation Counsel (May 17, 1979) citing an April, 1979 study
conducted by the Bureau of Biostatistics, N.Y.C. Dep't of Health.
29. Id., citing letter to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C. Comm'r of Health,
from Emanuel Goldberg, M.D., Chief, Div. of Cardiology, Beth Israel Medical
Center (April 30, 1979). Accord, letters to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C.
Comm'r of Health, from Edmund H. Sonnenblick, M.D., Chief, Div. of Cardiology,
Albert Einstein College of Medicine (April 17, 1979) and Richard Gorlin, M.D.,
Chairman, Dep't of Medicine, Mount Sinai Medical Center (April 27, 1979).
30. Letter from Richard Gorlin, M.D., supra note 29.
31. Letter from Mayor John V. Lindsay to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (May
6, 1970).
32. Id. See generally N.Y. Civ. SEv. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973).
33. See note 155 infra and accompanying text.
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passed to provide special benefits for New York City firemen suffering
from lung diseases.34 It was asserted that because the bill resulted
from collective negotiations between the city and a firefighters' union,
it would be highly inappropriate for the state to mandate that the city
35
provide a comparable benefit for heart disease.
There are other persuasive objections to the City Heart Bill. One is
that many years may have intervened between the time of entry into
service when a physical examination is required and the time a heart
condition is suffered; therefore, factors other than occupation may
have contributed to the condition. 3 Another argument is that the
statute's presumption that heart disease is an "accident" is "contrary
to existing principles in determining work-connected accidents or disabilities under the Workmen's Compensation [or] most retirement
systems and insurance programs." 37 For instance, the Retirement and
Social Security Law had authorized accidental disability retirement
benefits only when the applicant was completely incapacitated for the
performance of his duties. The City Heart Bill, however, allows such
38
benefits even when a member is only slightly or partially disabled. It
also has been argued that the bill's fundamental premise is discriminatory. All other municipal employees who might at some time develop
heart disease-whether or not their employment involves stress or
strenuous exercise-would not receive the same benefits. 3
Finally, there is the issue of cost. When proposed in 1970, there
were objections to the bill as a "mandated expense" and "burden on
local government. ' 40 The New York City Housing Authority Chairman stated that his agency's forced increased contributions to its
police officers' pension fund could have an unpredictable impact on
its budget. 4' When the merits of the bill were debated in 1979, the
New York City Chief Actuary estimated that in its first eight and
one-half years the City Heart Bill had cost the city $61 million more

34. Id.
35. Memorandum by State Div. of the Budget, 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 508 (May 4,
1970). See also letter from Simeon Golar, Chairman, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (May 11, 1970).
36. Memorandum by State Div. of the Budget, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Report from N.Y.S. Dep't of Audit & Control to Robert R. Douglass, Counsel
to the Governor (May 8, 1970).
39. Letter from Herbert H. Smith, Executive Director, County Officers Ass'n of
N.Y.S., to Robert R. Douglass (April 30, 1970).
40. Letter from Donald A. Walsh, N.Y.S. Conference of Mayors, to Robert R.
Douglass (April 27, 1970).
41. Letter from Simeon Golar, Chairman, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., to Governor
Nelson A. Rockefeller (May 11, 1970).
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than the city would have paid for ordinary disability and death
benefits. 42 He projected that the bill could cost the city an additional
43
$6.2 million a year in the future.
Determined to curb the rising costs of the Heart Bill,44 the Mayor,
in 1979, instructed his representative on the Pension Boards 45 to seek
from the Corporation Counsel 46 "a definition of the term 'accident'
and advise the boards whether [the City Heart Bill] incorporates or
stands apart from the general requirement for line-of-duty pensions
that an 'accident' be required. ' 47 The result was a decision overruling a 1973 Corporation Counsel Opinion. 48 The earlier opinion was
42. Memorandum from Jonathan Schwartz, N.Y.C. Chief Actuary, to Philip R.
Michael, First Deputy Comm'r, N.Y.C. Dep't of Investigation (April 20, 1979).
43. The fiscal impact of the Heart Bill was disputed in 1979 by the firefighters'
union. It attacked the Chief Actuary's assumption that all Heart Bill retirees would
have been retired for ordinary disability payments, absent the bill, and claimed that
a relatively small percentage of heart retirees needed the bill to retire with accident
disability payments. It was the union's contention that line-of-duty accident payments would have provided such accidental benefits. The Fire Department's review
of 670 heart disease cases rebutted this contention, and established that approximately 70% of the claimants would not have received accident disability benefits
without the Heart Bill. More recently it has been estimated by the N.Y.C. Finance
Commissioner's Pension Boards representative that approximately 75% would not
have received accident benefits. Yet the reduction by 25-30 % of the Chief Actuary's
cost estimate of $12.3 million would probably be offset by the cost of Transit and
Housing Authority police Heart Bill cases, which the Chief Actuary did not include
in his 1979 calculations. Interview in N.Y.C. with James J. Dwyer, N.Y.C. Finance
Commr's representative to the Police and Fire Dep't Pension Boards (November 12,
1981). See also note 42 supra; Press Release by Office of the Mayor, City of New York
(June 7, 1979).
44. A major source of anti-Heart Bill sentiment was the difference between the
city's application of the bill as compared with the N.Y.S. Retirement System's application. Between 1970 and 1978, the City Police and Fire Pension Funds, having a
combined total of 36,000 members, approved 995 police pensions and 722 fire
pensions under the City Heart Bill. Between 1970 and 1977, the State, with approximately 32,000 members, only approved fourteen Heart Bill line-of-duty pensions.
Letter from Philip R. Michael, First Deputy Commissioner, N.Y.C. Dep't. of Investigation, to Allen G. Schwartz, N.Y.C. Corporation Counsel (January 9, 1978).
45. See note 2 supra (Police and Fire Department Pension Boards).
46. The Corporation Counsel of New York City is the head of the law department.
As the attorney and counsel for the city and its agencies, the Corporation Counsel has
charge and conduct of all of the law business and other matters in which the city is
interested. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 16, §§ 391, 394 (1976).
47. Four questions were presented to the Corporation Counsel for consideration:
(1) In heart cases, must it be established that disability or death was the natural and
proximate result of an accident in order to warrant the granting of accident disability
retirement or accidental death benefits? (2) If so, what is the meaning of the term
"accident"? (3) Does § 207-k incorporate a presumption of accident? (4) Is the § 207-k
presumption rebuttable? Letter from Philip R. Michael to Allen G. Schwartz (January 8, 1978). For discussion of presumptions as they relate to the Heart Bill, see notes
9, 22 supra and accompanying text.
48. Op. Corp. Counsel (February 28, 1979).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

deemed to be incorrect because it stated that the bill not only included
a job connection presumption, but also contained a presumption that
the injury was an accident. 49 The Corporation Counsel asserted in
1979 that the city's Administrative Code50 provisions defined accident
as a discrete and unforeseeable event and, therefore, accident should
not be presumed under the heart bill because the language of the bill
does not mention accident. 51 Finally, he concluded that Pension
Board Trustees should more carefully inquire about facts to rebut that
presumption. By more carefully scrutinizing applications for accident
disability benefits, the city could ultimately slow down its rising
pension costs. 52
Despite the Mayor's vigorous opposition to the City Heart Bill, the
Governor reapproved the bill in 1979, stating that although it contained an "unsupportable" presumption, it was presented to him as
part of omnibus legislation. 53 Therefore, the City Heart Bill was
enacted despite many strong public policy arguments against it.

49. Id., citing Op. Corp. Counsel 107,869 (November 30, 1973).

50. Id., citing

NEW YORK,

N.Y.,

ADMIN. CODE

§§ B19-7.84, B19-7.8 (1976).

51. See note 8 supra.
52. Op. Corp. Counsel at 18 (February 28, 1979). Throughout the opinion, the
Corporation Counsel cited such cases as D'Alessandro v. Levitt, 59 A.D.2d 967, 399
N.Y.S.2d 289 (3d Dep't 1977); Acciavatti v. Levitt, 57 A.D.2d 131, 393 N.Y.S.2d 613
(3d Dep't 1977) and Timpson v. New York State Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement
System, 54 A.D.2d 812, 388 N.Y.S.2d 43 (3d Dep't 1976), in which accidental
disability benefits were denied to police officers and firefighters who were members
of the State Retirement System. In his view, the State Heart Bill was being interpreted the way the City's should have been. Id. at 10. Thus, the granting of accidental pensions should be precluded in the majority of cases reviewed. But see Ferrigno
v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 63 A.D.2d 872, 405 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st
Dep't 1978), afl'd, 48 N.Y.2d 788, 399 N.E.2d 946, 423 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1979) (policeman's cardiac condition not job related, thus he was entitled to ordinary, not accidental, disability). McPartland v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund,
N.Y.L.J., December 14, 1978, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (separate proof of
accident causation for N.Y.C. firemen and policemen); DeSio v. Codd, N.Y.L.J.,
October 22, 1974, at 19, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (degenerative disease not an
accident; policeman therefore not entitled to accident disability pension). The language of the City Heart Bill also specifically states that its provision would supercede
any local legislation. See note 7 supra. It is important to realize that the Administrative Code is the result of enabling legislation, while the City Heart Bill establishes
presumptions and evidentiary guidelines governing the Administrative Code's rules
and regulations.
53. Governor's Memorandum filed with 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 321 (June 29, 1979).
Relying on the state's ability to overcome the presumption found in the State Heart
Bill, Governor Carey urged the Medical Boards and Trustees of NYCERS to "take the
administrative and legal steps necessary to prevent any further abuse in this area."
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2. New York State's Heart Bill
The State Heart Bill was enacted in 1969. Originally it contained
the presumption that injury to or impairment of the heart was the
natural and proximate result of an accident, unless any substantial
evidence to the contrary could be shown. 54 Four years later the
legislature amended the statute by extending to covered state police
officers and firefighters the presumption that such disease was "incurred in the performance and discharge of duty." 55 The following
year, however, the presumption of accidental causality for police
officers was deleted, 5 prompting the New York City Corporation
Counsel to review the City Heart Bill's presumptions regarding accident. His opinion concluded that the City Heart Bill, like the
amended state bill, created the rebuttable presumption that heart
disease disability, in the police and fire services, was caused by a
57
line-of-duty accident.
Nearly all of the decisions rendered under the State Heart Bill have
upheld a strict interpretation requiring specific proof of accidental
injury.58 For example, if a police officer is chasing a robbery suspect
and suffers a heart attack, this would be considered an activity within
the normal course of police duties and not accidental within the
meaning of the statute. The presumption of job causality has rarely
been upheld. 5 A typical case would be a firefighter who has a

54. 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 1103, § 1.
55. 1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 1046, § 30.
56. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 967, § 1.
57. Op. Corp. Counsel, No. 107,867 (November 30, 1973).
58. See, e.g., Brown v. Levitt, 58 A.D.2d 915, 397 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1977);
Conn v. Levitt, 52 A.D.2d 1021, 383 N.Y.S.2d 703 (3d Dep't 1976); Behan v. Levitt,
52 A.D.2d 963, 382 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't 1976); Nosworthy v. Levitt, 50 A.D.2d
976, 376 N.Y.S.2d 654 (3d Dep't 1975); Magliulo v. Levitt, 50 A.D.2d 698, 377
N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1975); Cunningham v. Levitt, 40 A.D.2d 915, 337 N.Y.S.2d
684 (3d Dep't 1972).
59. Fischer v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 858, 410 N.Y.S.2d 378 (3d Dep't 1978) (evidence
that city fireman had underlying atherosclerotic disease, was diabetic, overweight,
and a heavy smoker, was sufficient to rebut presumption that a heart attack suffered
off-duty was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty); DeLeon v. Levitt,
65 A.D.2d 646, 409 N.Y.S.2d 456 (3d Dep't 1978) (statutory presumption that
fireman's death from heart disease was a natural and proximate result of an accident
did not change long-standing definition of "accident" in the pension context or
diminish State Comptroller's authority to determine the factual issue); D'Alessandro
v. Levitt, 59 A.D.2d 967, 399 N.Y.S.2d 289 (3d Dep't 1977) (accident presumption
no longer retained for policemen with respect to heart impairment); Pastor v. Levitt,
58 A.D.2d 669, 395 N.Y.S.2d 711 (3d Dep't 1977) (to entitle applicant to accidental
retirement allowance, heart disability must be caused by an accident in the course of
employment and statute only creates presumption that heart impairment was the
result of an accident which may be rebutted by substantial evidence to the contrary);
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proven underlying coronary atherosclerotic condition ° and happens
to suffer a heart attack6 ' as he carries a fire hose to a hydrant. This is
2
not considered to be a result of performing his firefighting duties.
Acciavatti v. Levitt, 57 A.D.2d 131, 393 N.Y.S.2d 613 (3d Dep't 1977) (a policeman
must establish that the results of his disabling disease were proximately caused by an
accident); Weiss v. Levitt, 55 A.D.2d 724, 389 N.Y.S.2d 176 (3d Dep't 1976) (presumption that policeman's heart disability was the result of an accident was not
conclusive, but instead may be rebutted by substantial evidence to the contrary);
Timpson v. N.Y.S. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 54 A.D.2d 812, 388
N.Y.S.2d 43 (3d Dep't 1976) (evidence sufficient to rebut presumption that disability
was result of an accident incurred in the performance of claimant's duty). A number
of other cases also hold that the court, by statute, is bound to accept the State
Comptroller's reading of the State Heart Bill in disability cases. See, e.g., Merkle v.
Levitt, 69 A.D.2d 973, 416 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dep't 1979); Sansone v. Levitt, 67
A.D.2d 1044, 413 N.Y.S.2d 500 (3d Dep't 1979); Tremblay v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 901,
410 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1978); Nolan v. Comptroller, 59 A.D.2d 799, 398
N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't 1977); Clark v. Levitt, 50 A.D.2d 695, 375 N.Y.S.2d 461 (3d
Dep't 1975).
60. Atherosclerosis is a form of arteriosclerosis, the general condition characterized by thickening and hardening of the arterial walls. Atherosclerosis is the development of deposits or plaque within the inner wall of an artery, and is the most
frequently found coronary artery disease. Note, Heart Injuries Under Workers' Compensation: Medical and Legal Considerations, 14 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1365 (1980).
Although the cause of atherosclerosis is unknown, multiple "risk factors" seem to
increase the chances of a person developing it. The major risk factors are hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and cigarette smoking. Studies have shown that other
risk factors are less important, but can play a role. These include diabetes, excessive
weight, sedentary lifestyle, family history, aggressiveness and competitiveness. Id.,
citing Sagall, Compensable Heart Disease, 5 Trial 29, 30 (1968); Wolinsky, Atherosclerosis, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, § 362 at 1218, 1221 (15th ed., 1979). See
also letter from Harvey C. Kemp, Jr., M.D., Director, Div. of Cardiology, St. Luke's
Hospital Center, to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C. Comm'r of Health (April. 12,
1979) (discussion of job stress and risk factors).
61. "Heart attack" is the common name for myocardial infarction. The myocardium is the heart muscle which contracts rhythmically to pump a continuous flow of
blood. Note, Heart Injuries Under Workers' Compensation: Medical and Legal
Considerations, 14 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1980), citing Edwards, The Cardiac
Patient and the Workmen's Compensation System: Medical Aspects, 1968 ABA SECTION INS. NEG. & COMP. LAW 264. In order to function properly, the myocardium
requires the nutrients and oxygen carried by the blood from coronary arteries. Id.,
citing Roth, Myocardial Infarction and the Compensation Law, 1970 LECAL MED.
ANN. 357, 358. Development of plaque in the coronary arteries is a gradual process
which can take several years before adversely affecting the myocardium. Myocardial
ischemia can arise as a result of reduction of blood flow through the coronary arteries
because of atherosclerotic obstruction. Id., citing Lesch, Ross & Braunwald, Ischemic Heart Disease, HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 1261, 1262 (8th
ed. 1977). Myocardial infarction, one type of myocardial ischemia, is a severe
manifestation of ischemia where an area of the myocardium dies due to a sudden and
severe decrease in its blood supply. Symptoms of myocardial infarction can include
severe chest pain with sweating, nausea, giddiness and vomiting. Id. at 1337, citing
Julian, Myocardial Infarction, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, § 363.3, at 1229-30
(15th ed. 1979).
62. A frequent point of contention in New York and other states is the amount of
evidence needed to rebut or overcome the presumption. One major difference,
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Therefore, there is a major distinction between the city and state
bills: under the State Heart Bill, the burden of proof regarding accident causation has been shifted to the employee,6 3 while under the
City Heart Bill, the burden has been placed upon the employer. In
fact, the difficulty of proving causation as a result of the strict definition of accident under the State Heart Bill has been an important
factor in the few accident disability pensions that have been awarded
under that bill. 4 In addition, there is perhaps a disincentive for
injured employees under the state bill to file for accident disability
pensions in that by law, they can remain on full, paid sick leave for
that period of disability until their application for accident disability
is approved or until they reach mandatory retirement age. Such police
officers and firefighters cannot be retired on ordinary disability pensions. Thus, an injured member might not seek accident disability
because a denial of this application would have no adverse effect on
however, is that in jurisdictions other than New York, a definition of "accident" is
rarely found in the statutes. Florida's statute, for example, includes an accident
presumption for both police officers and firefighters. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.18,

185.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974-80). Connecticut's Heart Bill,

CONN.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 7-433a, 7-433c (West 1973 & Supp. 1980-81), grants disability benefits when
the police officer's or firefighter's impairment of health occurs on- or off-duty.
Connecticut's statute is also one of the few which specifies the public policy rationale
behind the legislation. Section 7-433c was established "in recognition of the unusual
risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusual high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hypertension, which would act as an inducement to
attracting and securing persons for such employment, and in recognition that the
public interest and welfare will be promoted by providing such protection for such
... members .... " Id. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108-1/2, §*6-151.1 (SmithHurd Supp. 1981-82) (the legislature expressed its concern that since firemen perform
unusual tasks in time of stress and danger, are exposed to great heat and extreme cold
in certain seasons, and are required to work in the midst of heavy smoke and toxic
fumes, they should be afforded special pension rights). Several states provide such
benefits for police and firefighters in large municipalities only. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§§ 11-43-144, 36-30-20 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-30-508, 31-30-608 (1977).
Most apply the Heart Bill to any municipality, regardless of population. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.18, 185.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974-80); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7-433a (West 1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 32, § 94 (Michie/Law Co-op
1973).
63. Through Heart Bills, the legislature sought to relieve police officers and firefighters of the heavy burden of establishing a link between their heart ailments and
their jobs. The burden has been shifted to the government with respect to job-relatedness, and the presumption is difficult to rebut. There is not the same need regarding accident causation, which is expressly required under the State Heart Bill.
However, New York City courts have interpreted the language of the City Heart Bill
as including an accident presumption, even though the statute contains no such
specific presumption. See text accompanying notes 75, 76 infra.
64. See, e.g., notes 83, 84, 88 infra. See also Brief for Respondents at 63, Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438
N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). Brief for Appellants at 26-34, DeMilia v. McGuire, 52 N.Y.2d
ANN.

463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981).
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the injured member since he can receive a full salary until he chooses
5
to retire.
B. Judicial and Administrative Interpretations
In general, a heart bill application is first reviewed by a medical
board and is then forwarded, under the city bill, to the Police or Fire
Department's Pension Board of Trustees, and under the state bill, to
the State Comptroller.6
It is only when the applicants or government administrators challenge the Boards' or Comptroller's rulings
that a court proceeding is initiated. Court proceedings begin in the
New York State Supreme Court and are appealable.
1. New York City's Heart Bill
Two primary issues have been involved in City Heart Bill cases:
whether injuries were presumptively sustained in the line of duty and
whether injuries were presumptively an accident. On both issues the
city usually has lost because it has not chosen or has not been able to
rebut the strong dual presumptions propounded by police and fire
unions. 67
Medical Boards have upheld the dual presumption of line-of-duty and
accident causation in City Heart Bill cases.66 Courts have accepted
the city boards' proposition that the bill's purpose was "to overcome
...the necessity ... of having to connect their heart condition to a
specific incident except in particularly dramatic and traumatic occurrences. Stresses and strains upon the cardiac system do not arise
overnight, but are a cumulative result of recurrent crises." 69 In
Lemmerman v. McGuire,70 for example, a city policeman's application for accidental disability benefits, claiming disabling arrhythmia
or intrinsic heart disease, was denied by the Medical Board three
times. When the officers sought a declaratory judgment, 7' the New
York State Supreme Court held that under the City Heart Bill the
presumption of job-relatedness carries with it the presumption of
accidental causation.7 2 In another case, petitioner had severe chest
65. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207(a), amended 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 965, § 1; §
207(c), amended 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 727, § 1 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
66. See generally note 2 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 73-76 infra.
68. The NYCERS system could apply the same rule to cases involving Transit and
Housing police officers who are also covered by the Heart Bill. NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN.

CODE §

B3-1.0 (1976).

69. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 104 Misc. 2d at 834, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 913.
70. 102 Misc. 2d 56, 58, 422 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (1979).
71. Id. at 57, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
72. Id.
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pains, irregular heart beat, and a high pulse rate. 73 His application
for accident benefits was denied because the condition was "not job
related. ' 74 In reviewing the Pension Board decision, the court found
that the city failed to prove by competent evidence that the disabling
heart condition was not job related. 75 These cases are typical of the
lack of success by the city when it has chosen to contest the award of
an accident disability pension.7 6 The city's experience has been simi77
lar to that of most states in the nation.

73. Sweeney v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J., November 15, 1979, at 7, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), afj'd, 81 A.D.2d 554, 440 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1st Dep't 1981).
74. Id.
75. Id. Accord, Taylor v. Police Pension Fund, N.Y.L.J., February 26, 1974, at
16, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Medical Board report so uncertain and ambiguous
as to cause of heart disease that case should go to trial); Drake v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J.,
March 30, 1979, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (petitioner sustained his burden
by submitting proof that disability was caused by heart disease). But see Sullivan v.
Board of Trustees of Fire Pension Fund, 42 A.D.2d 541, 541, 345 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10 (1st
Dep't 1973), where the cause of a firefighter's disability was in dispute. The court
stated in dicta that if it were a heart condition as claimed, there would have been a
rebuttable presumption that it was of accidental origin. After extensive examination,
petitioner was found to be suffering from a neurosis, and was retired. Thus, if the
Medical Board were to find that a disabling neurosis could result from his job
performance, petitioner could not receive accidental benefits. Id. The presumption
was also successfully rebutted by the city in Ferrigno v. Board of Trustees of Police
Pension Fund, 63 A.D.2d 872, 405 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st Dep't 1978), af'd, 48 N.Y.2d
788, 399 N.E.2d 946, 423 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1979), where although a police lieutenant
had a history of surgery and radiation for Hodgkin's Disease, and the court would not
overturn the Medical Board's findings. See also Manza v. Malcolm, 44 A.D.2d 794,
355 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1974) (it was within the purview of the Medical Board to
resolve conflicts regarding service connected disabilities). Accord, Matter of Cama
(McGuire), N.Y.L.J., Jan 5, 1982, at 11, cols. 1-2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Board of
Trustees acted reasonably in determining that alcohol poisoning, not severe coronary
arteriosclerosis, was cause of police detective's death). But cf. Bulger v. Board of
Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 51 A.D.2d 950, 381 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1st Dep't 1976)
(Medical Board relied on incorrect autopsy report); Seubert v. McGuire, Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County, Index No. 17893/78, March 1, 1979 (Medical Board's determination
denying cardiac disease was arbitrary and unreasonable). Cf. Edwards v. Codd, 59
A.D.2d 148, 398 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1977) (probationary police officer, dismissed after suffering heart attack, should have been retired under the City Heart
Bill).
76. See, e.g., Bennett v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, N.Y.L.J.,
September 22, 1980, at 6, cols. 3-4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (no merit to respondents'
contention that petitioner must prove that specific accident caused hypertensive
cardiac vascular disease); Walsh v. Codd, 68 A.D.2d 805, 414 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't
1979) (once the Police Department Board of Trustees determined that an accident
did not cause disabling condition, its duty was performed); Altman v. McGuire,
N.Y.L.J., August 26, 1980, at 5, cols. 3-4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (mere fact that
heart condition was caused by emotional stress is conclusory and should not have
been the basis for denying accident benefits). But see Belnavis v. Board of Trustees of
Fire Pension Fund, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (1st Dep't).
77. Because most of the Heart Bills in the country establish a presumption of work
connection to cardiac problems, the underlying issue is frequently the strength of the
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2. New York State's Heart Bill
In contrast with the large number of New York City administrative
and judicial decisions which have granted accident disability pensions, few have been granted under the state law when applicants
have disputed the state medical board or comptroller's decisions. Of
the total number of accident retirement allowances granted by the
state, approximately 6% were awarded under the bill.78 Medical
evidence gathered by the State Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement
System has been sufficient, in nearly all cases, to rebut the "in-service"
(line-of-duty) and accident presumptions contained in the law. In
such cases, applicants are usually retired on ordinary disability pensions.79
The accident presumption under the state pension system rarely has
been rebutted. For example, in an early pre-heart bill case, Croshier

presumption, who can rebut it, and how. In most states the presumption, when
litigated, has proven to be quite strong. Police and firefighters, on the whole, have
been accorded their disability pensions despite efforts by government retirement
systems to rebut it. In California, for example, where the employer's evidence was
not sufficient to rebut the presumption, "[s]uch heart trouble or pneumonia so
developing or manifesting itself in such cases shall in no case be attributed to any
disease existing prior to such development or manifestation." CAL. LAB. CODE, §
3212.5 (West Supp. 1981). See also San Francisco v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Bd., 49 Cal. App. 3d 689, 122 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1975), aff'd, 583 P.2d 151
(1978); Bussa v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 259 Cal. App.2d 261, 66 Cal. Rptr.
204 (1968). Accord, Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, 344 So.2d 923 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977), quashed in part, remanded in part, 372 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1979);
Division of Retirement v. Putnam, 386 So.2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see also
Daniels v. Division of Retirement, 389 So.2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Evidence of pre-existing heart disease has also been held not to relate to occupation in
Michigan. Schave v. Department of State Police, 58 Mich. App. 178, 227 N.W.2d
278 (1975) (employer had to affirmatively prove non-occupational causation). Accord, City of Oak Ridge v. Campbell, 511 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. 1974) In Virginia,
history of a fireman's emphysema, coronary artery disease and heavy cigarette smoking was insufficient to rebut the presumption. Page v. City of Richmond, 218 Va.
844, 241 S.E.2d 775 (1978). The employer had to adduce evidence of a non-work
related cause of the disability. Id. at 848, 241 S.E.2d at 777.
78. Memorandum of New York State Permanent Comm'n on Public Employees
Pension & Retirement System Report, May 25, 1977.
79. To receive ordinary disability retirement benefits, a police officer or firefighter must have at least ten years of service. He or she undergoes at least one medical
examination, and the Comptroller determines whether the member is physically or
mentally incapacitated for duty and should be retired for ordinary disability. The
actual retirement allowance granted depends on several factors, including whether
or not the applicant is sixty years old, the amount of his accumulated pension
contributions, the actuarial equivalent of the reserve-for-increased-take-home pay,
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v. Levitt, 80 the New York Court of Appeals sustained the State Comptroller's determination that a forest ranger's fatal heart attack, incurred while fighting a fire, was not an accident for the purposes of
accidental death benefits. 8 ' The decedent had a mild cardiac insufficiency and had previously been told by doctors not to return to active
firefighting duties. His subsequent death, therefore, was not consid82
ered to be an accident incurred during the performance of his job.
Croshier helped lay the groundwork for maintaining a strict requirement of proof of accident causality in many State Heart Bill decisions
rendered since 1969.83 In one case, 84 evidence that a police officer
had been treated for heart disease for the past six years was sufficient
to rebut the presumption that a heart attack occurring on duty was
the result of an accident. 8 5 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals
in Bunnell v. New York State Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement
System, 86 held that a firefighter did not establish any relationship
between the pulling of a firehouse hose and the onset of heart disease.
The court also found that he had suffered from an underlying athero87
sclerotic disease prior to the hose-pulling incident.
The deletion of the accident presumption for police officers in 1974
resulted in a continuation of the court's rigorous requirements regarding burdens of proof. In construing the legislative intent behind this
amendment, the appellate division frequently ruled that police officers must clearly establish that their disabilities were the proximate
result of an accident. 88 This reasoning was based, in part, on a prior

and a pension computed according to his final salary and years of service. N.Y.
RErim. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 362 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
80. 5 N.Y.2d 259, 157 N.E.2d 486, 184 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1959).
81. Id. at 266, 157 N.E.2d at 489, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Sansone v. Levitt, 67 A.D.2d 1044, 413 N.Y.S.2d 500 (3d Dep't
1979); accord, Tremblay v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 901, 410 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1978)
(police officer's disability not accidental, and he was thus not entitled to accident
disability under this section).
84. Brown v. Levitt, 58 A.D.2d 915, 397 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1977).
85. Id. at 916, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
86. 50 A.D.2d 244, 377 N.Y.S.2d 935 (3d Dep't 1975), appeal dismissed, 39
N.Y.2d 742, 349 N.E.2d 893, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1976). See also Magliulo v. Levitt,
50 A.D.2d 698, 377 N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1975) (detective operating police car not
disabled as proximate result of accident and thus denied accident and disability
payments).
87. Id.
88. Acciavatti v. Levitt, 57.A.D.2d 131, 393 N.Y.S.2d 613 (3d Dep't 1977). See
also Nosworthy v. Levitt, 50 A.D.2d 976, 376 N.Y.S.2d 654 (3d Dep't 1975) (substantial evidence presented that petitioner was not incapacitated by possible herniated
disc).
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decision in which the court had held that the legislature had not
intended to eliminate the accident requirement when it added a rebuttable accident presumption.8 9
As to the line of duty requirement, the State Comptroller usually
has been able to introduce evidence rebutting the presumption. In
Fischer v. Levitt,9 0 a city fireman suffered a heart attack at home
after he had been off-duty for three days. The court was persuaded by
the Comptroller's presentation of evidence showing that the fireman
had underlying atherosclerotic disease 9 and diabetes, was a heavy
smoker and was overweight. All of these factors combined to rebut the
work connection presumption, and the court held that he was not
entitled to an accident disability pension. 92 The state also has successfully rebutted the presumption when a police officer's disability was
actually found to be the result of insufficient heart muscle reserve
3
caused by a heart attack sustained during purely personal activities.
A few other jurisdictions have similarly treated heart bill requirements, scrutinizing applications rather strictly instead of adopting a
4
lenient attitude towards granting pensions .9
89. Weiss v. Levitt, 55 A.D.2d 724, 389 N.Y.S.2d 176, (3d Dep't 1976). This
holding was reaffirmed the same year, with the court again taking notice of the
revised statutory requirements. D'Alessandro v. Levitt, 59 A.D.2d 967, 399 N.Y.S.2d
289 (3d Dep't 1977).
90. 65 A.D.2d 858, 410 N.Y.S.2d 378 (3d Dep't 1978).
91. See note 60 supra.
92. 65 A.D.2d at 859, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 379. Accord, Timpson v. New York State
Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 54 A.D.2d 81, 388 N.Y.S.2d 43 (3d Dep't
1976) (walking upstairs did not constitute accident, and risk factors, such as obesity,
smoking, hypertension and diabetes were sufficient to rebut presumption).
93. Behan v. Levitt, 52 A.D.2d 963, 382 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't 1976).
94. In three states, Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Texas, the municipal employer
was able to rebut the link between disability and occupation. City of Tuscaloosa v.
Howard, 55 Ala. App. 701, 318 So.2d 729 (1975), held that there was no accident
when claimant had experienced chestpains as he performed firehouse cleaning duties.
Further, the myocardial infarction resulting from progressive arteriosclerotic heart
disease was not a fireman's employment hazard. Two years later, Alabama's Heart
Bill, ALA. CONE, tit. 37, § 450(4) (1977), was challenged as violating due process
when it was amended to exclude firemen in cities with a population of 250,000 or
over. Norris v. Seibels, 353 So.2d 1165 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), 353 So.2d 1169 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1978). The court held that there was no reasonable relationship between
the classification and purpose of the pension law, and hence, the statute was struck
down as unconstitutional. Id. Pennsylvania and Texas have given weight to the
determinations that employees did not meet their burden of proof regarding service
connection. Bogen v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 412, 378 A.2d 1307
(1977). See also Smith v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 53 Pa. Commw. Ct. 164, 417 A.2d 810
(1980); City of Houston v. Caldwell, 582 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Cline v.
Firemen's Relief & Retirement Fund, 545 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). Where
the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the employer as to work causation,
some states permit the employer to rebut the prima facie case by proving that the
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A number of state disability pension applicants have challenged the
appropriateness of the State Comptroller's determination of what
constitutes an accident under the State Heart Bill. An example is
Merkle v. Levitt, 95 where the court held that the State Comptroller's
substantial
determination would not be disturbed if supported byevery
major
6 The Comptroller's role has been upheld in
evidence.
case seeking appellate review. 97 "The Comptroller's determination
disapproving petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement is factual and thus, if supported by substantial evidence, must be
decisions on retirement
affirmed since 'exclusive authority' to render
98
applications is vested in the Comptroller."
III. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman
The Office of the Mayor in 1979 urged the state legislature not to
renew the City Heart Bill because it was costly for the city 99 and did
not have a medical basis. 0 0 As a result, two actions were comemployment did not contribute to the injury. See, e.g., Buse v. City of New Orleans,
349 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Vincent v. City of New Orleans, 326 So. 2d
401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ denied, 329 So. 2d 760 (1976); New Hampshire
Ins. Co. v. Duvall, 115 N.H. 215, 337 A.2d 533 (N.H. 1975). Oregon's Heart Bill,
however, describes the presumption as "disputable." OR. REV. STAT. §§ 41.360,
656.802-824(1)(2) (1979). If any evidence is presented by the employer, the claimant
must then prove his case. Norris v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 27 Or. App. 623, 557
P.2d 61 (1976) (testimony that heart attack was not work related disputed the
presumption); accord, Pflughaupt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 26 Or. App. 77, 552
P.2d 284 (1976) (cardiologists' testimony that no causal relationship existed between
heart attack and employment was sufficient to dispute the presumption).
95. 69 A.D.2d 973, 416 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dep't 1979).

96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Nolan v. Comptroller, 59 A.D.2d 799, 398 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't
1977) (finding by Comptroller that former police officer was not totally incapacitated by 'gunshot wounds was adequate to permit appellate court to evaluate and
review); Clark v. Levitt, 50 A.D.2d 695, 375 N.Y.S.2d 461 (3d Dep't 1975) (Comptroller's evaluation of conflicting medical testimony must be accepted in proceeding
on application for accident disability retirement).
98. 50 A.D.2d 695, 375 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462, citing N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW §
374(b) (McKinney 1971).
99. In his 1979 letter to Governor Carey opposing reenactment of the City Heart
Bill, Mayor Koch stated that the bill would cost the city an additional $12 million
annually for normal retirement costs. Urging the Governor to veto the 1979 omnibus
legislation of which the Heart Bill was a part, the Mayor asserted that "[a]t a time
when the City faces a potential budget gap of nearly $800 million in f.y. [fiscal year]
1982, when its unfunded pension liability is over $10 billion, when the fire pension
fund is bankrupt and when essential services, including police and fire, are being cut
to the bare minimum, we cannot afford the luxury of a $12 million Heart Bill."
Letter from Mayor Edward I. Koch to Governor Hugh L. Carey (June 26, 1979),
Governor's Bill Jacket (1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 321).
100. The Mayor's office relied on letters by prominent heart specialists and physicians. See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text. The Mayor also cited another
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menced, one by the police officers' union 1 0 1 and one by the firefight-ers' union, 02 alleging that the city's new approach to limiting pensions
under the heart bill was incorrect and seeking a judicial interpretation
of the bill. Two years later in Uniformed FirefightersAss'n, Local 94
v. Beekman, 10 3 the New York Court of Appeals rendered a decision on
these two cases in a consolidated action.
This was the first case in which the court of appeals was asked to
interpret the statute, and it affirmed several lower court decisions in
favor of the police and firefighters' unions. 0 4 In state supreme court,
the police' 0 5 and firefighters 10 had been the subject of mandamus

letter in the 1979 Governor's Bill Jacket, which said:
I presume that your reference to 'heart disease' means coronary artery
disease or is mainly concerned with that type of heart disease. The basic
pathologic lesion in coronary artery disease is atherosclerosis or arteriosclerosis. The precise etiology of arteriosclerosis or atherosclerosis remains
undetermined. To be sure, there are certain primary and secondary risk
factors that may contribute to the development of the disease but cannot
be considered the cause of the disease. Indeed, there is some controversy
over their relative significance.
In light of the fact that the cause of the disease remains undetermined, I
do not believe there is any scientific medical evidence to justify the validity
of the presumption that said condition was incurred in the performance
and discharge of duties pertaining to policemen and firemen.
Letter from Michael E. DeBakey, M.D., Baylor College of Medicine, Department of
Surgery, to Reinaldo A. Ferrer, M.D., N.Y.C. Comm'r of Health (April 28,1979).
On January 11, 1978, the Pension Commission conducted a public hearing on disability retirement problems at which it received testimony from medical experts as to the
legitimacy of the current heart bills. The testifying physicians unanimously concluded that the bills were not justified on a medical or scientific basis, and that with
respect to heart disease there was no reason to treat policemen and firemen differently from the general population. Memorandum of N.Y.S. Permanent Comm'n on
Public Employee Pension and Retirement System (May 1, 1978).
101. DeMilia v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J., November 20, 1979, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), affd, 76 A.D.2d 1039, 429 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1st Dep't 1980), afJ'd, 52
N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981); City of New York v. DeMilia,
N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1979, at 13, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 73 A.D.2d 849,
422 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1st Dep't 1979).
102. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beckman, 104 Misc. 2d 829, 430
N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aJf'd, 76 A.D.2d 1043, 429 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st
Dep't 1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981).
103. 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981).
104. See notes 101-103 supra.
105. The PBA suit commenced after the issuance of the 1979 Corporation Counsel
Opinion, see notes 46-52 supra, when City Board of Trustee members of the Police
Pension Fund rejected the Medical Board's certification of approximately fifteen
applications for line-of-duty widows' pensions and disability retirements based on
heart-related injuries. Brief for Petitioners-Respondents at 4, DeMilia v. McGuire, 52
N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). The city's antipathy towards
the Heart Bill would result in claimants having to prove that the cardiac problems
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actions when they refused to attend the Pension Board meeting in a
upon which applications were based were the natural and proximate result of a
specific accident. See Op. Corp. Counsel at 17 (February 28, 1979). Since the city
and union members disagreed about the definition of accident, a tie vote within the
Pension Board would undoubtedly occur. See note 2 supra. The Police Commissioner
would then be empowered to retire the applicants on ordinary pensions until the
impasse could be resolved. City of New York v. Schoeck, 294 N.Y. 559, 63 N.E.2d
104 (1945). In Schoeck, although the Fire Department's Medical Board had found
that an applicant for a line-of-duty disability retirement was disabled, the Board
concluded that such disability was not caused by the applicant's fire duties. A tie vote
at the Pension Board resulted in Schoeck's remaining in service, but with his application for disability retirement resolved. The city sued to compel Schoeck's retirement
on ordinary disability. The court of appeals held that when there is a tie vote
situation regarding causation, the court may not usurp the trustee's function by
ruling on evidentiary matters. The court further held that the applicant should be
retired at ordinary disability, with the Board of Trustees being allowed to resolve the
causation issue at a later date. If the Board were to later grant an accident disability,
the applicant would also have the right to receive retroactive accident disability
payments. The court noted that this might prevent the situation of a medically
incapacitated employee remaining unretired on the public payroll at full pay. Id. at
566-67, 63 N.E.2d at 107. To avoid a tie vote as occurred in Schoeck, union members
boycotted Police Pension Fund meetings; the city, however, was able to obtain an
order of mandamus requiring such union members to attend the meetings and vote
on all calendar items. City of New York v. DeMilia, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1979, at 13,
col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), af'd, 73 A.D.2d 849, 422 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dep't
1979). Justice Hughes held that police union trustee members were not justified in
refusing to attend Board meetings and that an applicant should not have to prove a
specific accident occurred.
A parallel action seeking declaratory judgment on the meaning of the City's Heart
Bill was commenced by the police union in DeMilia v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J., November 20, 1979, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). In granting the declaration, Justice
Ascione held that the City Heart Bill should be interpreted to afford a N.Y.C. police
officer the presumption that a heart condition "was incurred as an accident in the
performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent
evidence." Id. Justice Ascione also stated in dicta that "City Administration members
• . . attitude was directly contrary to the decisions of this Court and those of Special
Term construing § 207-k." Brief for Petitioners-Respondents at 16, DeMilia v.
McGuire, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). He described
the difficulty of proving that a cardiac impairment was accident induced, and stated
that the City Heart Bill was designed by the legislature to overcome this difficulty.
DeMilia v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J., November 20, 1979, at 6, col. 3. Justice Ascione
disagreed with the analogy made by the Corporation Counsel to Third Department
cases, see notes 46-52 supra, which had claimed that several major similarities existed
between the development of the City and State Heart Bills. Id. Justice Ascione's most
cogent argument was that State firemen and police officers receive full pay for their
entire period of disability until mandatory retirement, unlike their New York City
counterparts, and thus few apply for the benefits. Id. The declaratory judgment was
affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division. 76 A.D.2d 1039, 429 N.Y.S.2d
336 (1st Dep't 1980). The mandamus proceeding was not a part of the appeal at the
court of appeals.
106. Firefighters also boycotted Pension Board meetings and sought a ruling on
the proper interpretation of the City Heart Bill. This resulted in a consolidation of
the mandamus action and declaratory judgment actions. Uniformed Firefighters
Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 104 Misc. 2d 829, 430 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
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protest over the new policies espoused in the Corporation Counsel's
opinion. 10 7 In parallel actions, the unions sought declaratory judgment, attempting to elicit clarification of the City Heart Bill and a
decision on what the statute meant in terms of accident causation and
evidentiary proof.10 8 The declaratory judgment actions, affirmed by
the appellate division, 0 9 were decided in favor of the unions, and
established that members would be afforded the rebuttable presumption of job-to-injury connection and accidental causation.
The court of appeals agreed with the courts below that the plaintiff
unions were "entitled to a declaratory judgment that section 207-k of
the General Municipal Law creates a presumption that a disabling or
fatal heart condition suffered by a New York City police officer or
fireman was accidentally sustained as a result of his employment if not
rebutted by contrary proof."" 0 In so deciding, the state's highest
court rejected the city's contentions that the statute did not create any
presumption that the heart condition was accidental, and that the
employee or his family must affirmatively prove' "that the condition
was the result of a particular accident occurring at a specific time and
place."' 2 In fact, the effect of this decision may have been to establish

County 1980), afj'd, 76 A.D.2d 1043, 429 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1980) (per
curiam), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). The State
Supreme Court, special term, granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the firefighters' union and dismissed the mandamus proceeding. Id. Justice Greenfield construed the City Heart Bill in accordance with the 1973 Corporation Counsel Opinion,
see note 48-49 supra, and the views of the union trustees, that the statute provided a
presumptive entitlement to line-of-duty accidental disability pension benefits which
could only be rebutted by competent evidence. CompareJustice Greenfield's opinion
with Justice Ascione's, supra note 105. The court also held that the applicant would
not be required to prove that his line-of-duty disability was caused by a specific
accident. 104 Misc. 2d at 837, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
107. See notes 46-52 supra.
108. Id.
109. 76 A.D.2d 1039, 429 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1st Dep't 1980); 76 A.D.2d 1043, 429
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1980).
110. 52 N.Y.2d 463, 472, 420 N.E.2d 938, 942, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746, 750.
111. The amount of evidence necessary to overcome a presumption, in most New
York cases, has been "substantial" evidence presented by the adversary to the contrary. For a discussion of presumptions in connection with compensable injuries, see

4

BENDER'S

N.Y.

EVIDENCE

§ 230.02[2][i] (Supp. Dec. 1980). New York courts,

however, do not fully define "substantial evidence" when used in connection with
presumptions. It may mean evidence sufficient to support a finding of that non-existence of the presumed fact. See generally 4 BENDER'S N.Y. EVIDENCE § 230.04[3]
(1980).
112. The court agreed with the Police and Fire Unions that a "practical" definition of accident would not be "the result of any particular incident" but can be "a
gradual and progressive degeneration as a result of the continuous stress and strain of
the job." 52 N.Y.2d at 471, 420 N.E.2d at 941, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
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a conclusive dual presumption, given the city's lack of 3success in
presenting sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptions."1
Justice Wachtler, writing for the majority in a 5-2 opinion, based
his decision on several grounds. First, he rejected the city's contention
that the statute made no reference to accidental causation." 4 He
chose instead to look to extensive legislative history which showed that
proposed by the city would frustrate the statutory
"the literal reading
Ipurpose'."" 5 He quoted State Senator John Marchi, the bill's sponsor, who had stated that the purpose of the bill was to recognize heart
disease as an occupational hazard for police officers and firemen
which is not generally the product of one discrete incident but rather a
long-term condition." 6 Judge Wachtler concluded that a practical
interpretation would dispense with the need for pointing to particular
accidents as the condition's cause." 7 Thus, the court in Beekman
chose to look behind the actual wording of the statute to the purported intent of the legislature." 8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jasen agreed with the city that it was "indisputedly
clear that the statute does not provide for a presumption that the employee's disability or death was accidental." Id. at 474, 420 N.E.2d at 943, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 751. The
court was apparently endorsing the conclusion of the lower court in Beekman that if
the applicant has the burden of establishing that the etiology of his heart condition is
a specifically identifiable incident of trauma, this would be comparable to "giv[ing]
[with] one hand while taking away with another." 104 Misc. 2d at 837, 430 N.Y.S.2d
at 914.
113. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
114. Brief for Appellants at 11-15. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. Beekman, 52
N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981). Reply Brief for Appellants at

10, id.
115. Id. at 471, 420 N.E.2d at 941, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 749.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 472, 420 N.E.2d at 941, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 749. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Jasen stated that because the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous, the majority had gone beyond the bounds of proper judicial interpretation.
Furthermore, the same legislature knew how to create a dual presumption when
need be. The original State Heart Bill included an accident presumption. Such
presumption was deleted with respect to police officers in 1974, leaving only a
line-of-duty presumption.
118. The court adopted the principle that statutes should not be construed in a
manner inconsistent with the intent behind their enactment. N.Y. STATUTES § 144, at
291 (McKinney 1971). The United States Supreme Court has stated that a reasonable
construction of a statute, rather than one leading to absurdity or futility, is called for
to work its intended result. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S.
534, 543 (1940). This reasonable construction should be sought when the plain
meaning produces results at variance with the policy of the legislature. Id. It is fair to
say that the court considered the remarks by Senator John Marchi during the 1979
legislative debate an accurate expression of that legislative intent, since he was one of
the original drafters. See note 1 supra. If the statute were applied "simplistically, or
based on a mechanical reading", the legislative purpose would be denied. Pell v.
Coveney, 37 N.Y.2d 494, 496, 336 N.E.2d 421, 422, 373 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (1975).
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A second approach relied on by the Beekman court was to look
toward the successive re-enactment of the statute as significant. 19 The
city disputed the notion that re-enactment of a statute would necessarily constitute adoption of its repeated construction by administrative
agencies, arguing that a bill can be erroneously construed by such
interpreters.12 0 The New York Court of Appeals, however, followed
the general rule that when the legislature amends or renews a statute,
it is assumed that it was cognizant of pertinent judicial decisions. 121

Other New York cases have followed that reasoning, by holding that when language
is ambiguous, there should be inquiry into the statute's meaning. Matter of Caraballo, 49 N.Y.2d 488, 493, 403 N.E.2d 958, 960, 426 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (1980). New
York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 437, 343 N.E.2d 735, 738-39,
381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20-21 (1975); The Beekman court, in implementing the statute, was
attempting to examine its purpose and the legislatures' intent. See Williams v.
Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 598-99, 246 N.E.2d 333, 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478
(1969), quoting 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 316 (3d ed. 1943) ("[A]
statute is 'clear and unambiguous' because the court has considered the meaning of
the statute and reached a conclusion on the question of legislative intention.").
Legislative intent can also be identified as the "fundamental rule", the "great principle which is to control", and "the grand central light in which all statutes must be
read." N.Y. STATUTES, § 92 at 179 (McKinney 1971).
119. In United States v. Board of Comm'rs, the United States Supreme Court
stated that "when a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an
administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted
that interpretation, and this Court is bound thereby." 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978). See
also N.Y. STATUTES § 129 at 276 (McKinney 1971) ("Where the legislature has
enacted without material change a rule heretofore governing conduct by an administrative agency, it in effect adopts the practical construction which had been placed
on the rule by the agency.") Id. Going beyond the assumption that a statute must
follow the interpretation of executive branch officials, the legislative intent of the
statute was expressly indicated to the legislature by one of its authors, Senator John
Marchi. Transcript, supra note 1, at 4990-91. See also Board of Educ. v. City of New
York, 41 N.Y.2d 535, 543, 362 N.E.2d 948, 954, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148, 155 (1977);
Chatlos v. McGoldrick, 302 N.Y. 380, 388, 98 N.E.2d 567, 571 (1951).
120. Brief for Appellants at 41, Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v.
Beekman, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1981), citing Biddle v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938) (where a statutory provision is clear in its
language, subsequent re-enactment does not constitute adoption of any construction
placed upon it by an administrative agency); Del Giorno v. Police Dep't of the City,
of New York, 33 A.D.2d 665, 305 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1st Dep't 1969), afj'd, 26 N.Y.2d 821,
257 N.E.2d 900, 309 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1970) (following an erroneous administrative
construction, reenactment does not constitute adoption by the legislature of that
erroneous construction). See also Dougherty v. Makowski, 47 A.D.2d 580, 363
N.Y.S.2d 175 (4th Dep't 1975).
121. Matter of Cole, 235 N.Y. 48, 53 (1923). This rule is further supported by
several federal cases, including one which said that a court could accord "great
weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged
with its administration. This is especially so where the legislative body has re-enacted
the statute without pertinent change." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
274-75 (1974). Helvering v. Reynolds, 306 U.S. 110 (1939), involved the administrative construction of a revenue act which had been repeated regularly for at least forty
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Therefore, the court in Beekman held that any re-enactment of the
City Heart Bill must be read in light of previous judicial interpretations. 122
Finally, in an extension of the second rule the court followed a third
approach: an administrative construction or interpretation, such as
that rendered by the Medical Board or the Pension Board, should not
be changed by the courts unless the construction or interpretation
constitutes an error. 123 City officials had asserted that the legislature
acted with deliberation and knowledge when it purposely omitted an
accident presumption in the City Heart Bill. 24 As a result, the city
viewed the legislative purpose as being at variance with the language
of the statute and believed there was no need to seek extrinsic aids for
interpretation, such as relevant legislative history or interpretations by
agencies responsible for administering the statute. 2 5 It believed that
to resort to this method would be inappropriate since the language of
the statute was not ambiguous.126 Arguing for a strict construction of
the heart bill's language, the city had sought to compare the language
used in its bill with that found in the state bill. 27 The city concluded
that since the legislature had expressly included an accident presump-

years. See also Hotel Ass'n v. Weaver, 3 N.Y.2d 206, 214, 144 N.E.2d 14, 19-20, 165
N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1957) (Legislature retained and re-enacted provisions of rent law);
Matter of Foscarinis, 284 A.D. 476, 477-78, 132 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325-26 (1954) (statute
consistently and repeatedly interpreted in such a manner for thirteen years); Dobess
Realty Corp. v. Mazid, 186 Misc. 225, 231-32, 61 N.Y.S.2d 324, 330 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1946) (practical construction given statute by State Liquor Authority was
reasonable).
122. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 471-72,
420 N.E.2d 938, 941, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749 (1981).
123. "It is well recognized that a long-continued course of action by state or local
administrative officers is entitled to great weight unless manifestly wrong." N.Y.
STATUTES § 129 (McKinney 1971). The long-standing interpretation should be disturbed only if an interpretation is "irrational or unreasonable" or if it constitutes a
"clear error of law". United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956); Fineway
Supermarkets, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 48 N.Y.2d 464, 468, 399 N.E.2d 536, 538,
423 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651 (1979).
124. See Theurer v. Columbia Univ., 59 A.D.2d 196, 398 N.Y.S.2d 908 (3d Dep't
1977), where the court held that the existing statutes encompassed the same subject
matter as previously enacted, and the legislature was presumed to have acted with
deliberation and knowledge.
125. See New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 436-37, 343
N.E.2d 735, 738-39, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20-21 (1975), citing United States v. American
Trucking, where the court stated that absence of facial ambiguity is rarely conclusive, and that when aid to construction of the statute's meaning is available, its use
should not be forbidden.
126. See N.Y. STATUTES § 120 (McKinney 1971).
127. See notes 7, 8 and 22 supra.
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tion in the state bill, it would have done so in the City Heart Bill had
28
it meant for one to be included.
In rejecting the city's arguments and deferring to established administrative construction, the court held that "the practical application [of the statute] by the boards shows that they understood it to
have the effect of dispensing with the need for heart disability applicants to point to particular accidents as the cause of the condition...
[which] is entitled to great weight."1 29 The Beekman court compared
the city and state statutes and found that as to state employees "the
legislature . . . after some apparent experimentation, adopted a different approach to this type of presumption" 130 from that of the city,
where it "has not seen fit to change the statute or its settled effect
despite the city's ardent efforts."' 3' It concluded that "for the courts
to approve a change in the interpretation of the statute, which would
32
blunt its known impact, would amount to judicial repeal."
As to the meaning of accident, the court said that an accident is a
gradual and progressive degeneration resulting from the job's continuous stresses and strains. 133 This is significantly different from the
definition propounded by the city: a sudden, fortuitous, unexpected
event which causes an injury. 34 In so deciding, Justice Wachtler

128. See People ex rel West Side Elec. Co. v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway
Co., 187 N.Y. 58, 79 N.E. 892 (1907), where the court held that when a statute is
clear and unambiguous "practical construction" is inappropriate, especially when
the legislature has enacted other nearly identical legislation. See also Matter of
Caraballo, 49 N.Y.2d 488, 494, 403 N.E.2d 958, 961, 426 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1980)
(an administrative pronouncement is not to be slavishly followed when it runs
contrary to the clear wording of the statutory provision); Hines v. LaGuardia, 293
N.Y. 207, 216, 56 N.E.2d 553, 557 (1944) (administrative practice may not thwart a
statute, the purposes of which are clear); Travel House v. Grzechowiak, 31 A.D.2d
74, 79-80, 296 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695-96 (4th Dep't 1968), afJ'd, 24 N.Y.2d 1034, 250
N.E.2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1969) (taxicab licensing ordinance not ambiguous and
should have been given effect as it was written, not as administrators thought it
should have been written).
129. 52 N.Y.2d 463, 471-72, 420 N.E.2d 938, 941, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749.
130. Id. at 472, 420 N.E.2d at 942, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
131. Id.

132.- Id.
133. Id. at 471, 420 N.E.2d at 941, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
134. Woodruff v. R. H. Howes Const. Co., 228 N.Y. 276, 127 N.E. 270 (1920).
For an example of accident being defined as an event which takes place without
foresight or expectation and proceeding from an unknown cause, see Arthur A.
Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 6 A.D.2d 97, 175 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't
1958), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 222, 164 N.E.2d 704, 196 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1959). The city had
wanted the court to follow the earlier New York State workmen's compensation cases
and New York City Employees Retirement System rules requiring separate proof of
accident causation. For example, it must be shown that a member was injured or
died as the natural and proximate result of an accident sustained in the performance
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adopted the reasoning of prior decisions. An accident does not have to
be a particular event and can occur over a period of time. An analogy
was made to workmen's compensation cases, especially Gray v. Semet-Solvay Co., 35 where the New York Court of Appeals held that a
worker's death caused by mineral poisoning or serous meningitis due
to poisonous fumes was an accident, although the fatal poisoning was
not a discrete event. 36 The court also held in another workmen's
compensation case that an internal head injury, such as coronary
occlusion or thrombosis, when brought on by overexertion or strain in
the course of daily work, was an accident. 37 A further example is
of duty. See, e.g., 1938 N.Y. Laws ch. 407 (use of term "accident" in workmen's
compensation law), NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ B18-48.0(c), B19-7.9(c)
(1976). Croshier v. Levitt, 5 N.Y.2d 259, 157 N.E.2d 486, 184 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1959).
This requirement has been applied to New York City firemen and police officers. See,
e.g., Brady v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 601, 241 N.E.2d 236, 294 N.Y.S.2d 215
(1968); Drayson v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 37 A.D.2d 378, 326
N.Y.S.2d 328 (1st Dep't 1971), afJ'd, 32 N.Y.2d 852, 299 N.E.2d 684, 346 N.Y.S.2d
273 (1973); Matter of Vousden, Index No. 8635/80, July 8, 1980 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County); McPartland v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, N.Y.L.J., December 14, 1978, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); DeSio v. Codd, N.Y.L.J.,
October 22, 1974, at 19, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The city has also relied on
other appellate division holdings, beginning with McCadden v. Moore, 276 A.D.
490, 95 N.Y.S.2d 740 (4th Dep't), afJ'd, 301 N.Y. 760, 95 N.E.2d 819 (1950), to
support its position that specific accident causality, as defined in most of these cases,
has had to be proven. For examples of Third Department cases, see also Sansone v.
Levitt, 67 A.D.2d 1044, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 500 (3d Dep't 1979); Tremblay v. Levitt, 65
A.D.2d 901, 410 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1978); Selinger v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 668,
409 N.Y.S.2d 807 (3d Dep't 1978).
135. 231 N.Y. 518, 132 N.E. 870 (1921). Exposure to radioactive substances over a
period of several months and beryllium poisoning also have been upheld as accidental
injuries. Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Amer.,
411 Ill. 325, 104 N.E.2d 250 (1952) (radioactive substances); Beryllium Corp. v.
American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 223 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1955) (beryllium). Exposure to the persistent coughing of a tubercular inmate led to a correction officer's
contracting the disease, and this, too, was deemed to be an accident. Middleton v.
Coxsackie Correctional Facility, 38 N.Y.2d 130, 341 N.E.2d 527, 379 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1975).
136. 231 N.Y. at 518, 132 N.E. at 870.
137. Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., Inc., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950)
(overruling prior decisions that for a heart attack to be compensable, it must have
been caused by a strain more severe than was imposed by the usual nature of the
employee's work). See also Suber v. Hope's Windows, Inc., 38 A.D.2d 656, 327
N.Y.S.2d 294 (3d Dep't 1971) (machine operator suffered a sudden pain, constituting
an accidental injury); Jamroz v. Refined Syrups & Sugars, Inc., 33 A.D.2d 859, 305
N.Y.S.2d 916 (3d Dep't 1969) (an accident may be the result of continuous strenuous
physical efforts which contribute to the ultimate heart injury); Miner v. Chrysler
Corp., 33 A.D.2d 523, 304 N.Y.S.2d 52 (3d Dep't 1969); Ellis v. Armour & Co., 31
A.D.2d 690, 295 N.Y.S.2d 842 (3d Dep't 1968) (unexpected collapse of a claimant's
hip while standing on a platform was an accident); Jones v. Curran & Co., Inc., 33
A.D.2d 525, 303 N.Y.S.2d 541 (3d Dep't 1969) (heavy work reactivated underlying
osteomyelitis, constituting industrial accidental injury).
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Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 3 1 where the court found that a trial
attorney's heart attack was related to intense emotional and physical
injury within the meaning of the workstrain, and was an accidental
139
men's compensation law.
A second line of cases has held that an accident may be regarded as
an event unexpected in its cause or result. Causal connection has been
found between a neck condition and an accidental injury sustained
when a claimant's exposure to a strong draft forced her to protect her
neck by sitting in an awkward position. 140 Unexpected events include
emotional stress which produces an accident. In Klimas v. Trans
CaribbeanAirways, Inc.,' 41 an employee's fatal heart attack, brought
on by anxiety and mental stress resulting from fear of losing his job
with an airline, was considered to be an accident.142 Benefits were
awarded in another case for psychic and physical injury to a woman
who had discovered her supervisor's sudden suicide, because the court
found that her incapacitation due to acute stress was an accident. 1"3

The Beekman court has thus adopted a broad definition of accident, including the finding that a long-term condition may be consid-

ered job connected and accidental. This ruling has already had an
impact on several decisions in the New York State Supreme Court.
The Beekman decision has been cited by courts seeking guidance as
to the meaning of an accidental disability in litigation unrelated to the

138. 6 N.Y.2d 506, 510, 160 N.E.2d 901, 903, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656, 660 (1959),
(citing Masse: "what constitutes an industrial accident is to be determined by the
common sense viewpoint of the average man.").
139. Id. at 510, 160 N.E.2d at 903, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
140. Greensmith v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 21 A.D.2d 576, 251 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3d
Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 973, 265 N.Y.S.2d 288, 212 N.E.2d 774 (1965).
141. 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
142. Id. at 216, 176 N.E.2d at 717, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
143. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curry Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369
N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975). In other cases, courts have held that injuries caused by emotional stress or shock may be accidental within the purview of the compensation law.
See, e.g., Snyder v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights, 31 N.Y.2d 284, 290
N.E.2d 821, 338 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1972) (employee with diabetic condition suffered a
hemorrhage when told he would be discharged from employment); Lobman v.
Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 A.D.2d 931, 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 (3d Dep't 1963), aJJ'd,
15 N.Y.2d 506, 202 N.E.2d 559, 254 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1964) (sales manager's cerebral
thrombosis causally related to employment involving unusual emotional stress); Eckhaus v. Adeck Stores, Inc., 11 N.Y.2d 862, 182 N.E.2d 287, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1962)
(claimant sustained coronary attack as a result of near auto collision); Pickerell v.
Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926) (claimant attempting to avoid auto
accident sustained cerebral apoplexy followed by partial stroke). But cf. Abrasch v.
Teachers' Retirement Sys., N.Y.L.J., October 28, 1980, at 10, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County) (disabilities resulting from anxiety or stress on the job over an extended
period are not an accident for the purposes of accident disability retirement).
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City Heart Bill. In an action commenced in 1978, a city police officer
had suffered a hearing disability after 31 years of participating as a
range officer in Police Department pistol practice and marksmanship
training. 144 The Police Pension Board had confirmed his hearing
disability, but denied his application for accident disability. It found
that there had been no specific incident but instead had been a
deterioration of hearing over a period of time. 45 The court remanded for further investigation into the possibility that the disability
was the result of repeated exposure to loud noise. 46 Because the
Medical Board continued to recommend ordinary disability, citing the
officer's war service as the possible cause of the hearing problem, the
case came before the state supreme court in August, 1981. Citing
Beekman, the presiding justice applied the court of appeals' holding
by analogy, stating that absent contrary proof, accidental causation in
a hearing impairment case should be inferred,1 47 and that there was
no factual basis for the inference that the disability was attributable to
his war service. Beekman also has been cited in another hearing
impairment case involving long-term hearing loss, decided in favor of
148
the applicant seeking an accident disability pension.
More recently, Beekman was cited in a state supreme court decision
involving an action by a woman seeking accidental death benefits
when her son, a police officer, was killed during an off-duty scuffle in

144. Schussler v. Codd, N.Y.L.J., April 21, 1978, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Schussler v. Codd, N.Y.L.J., August 27, 1981, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County).
148. McManus v. McGuire, N.Y.L.J.; October 27, 1980, at 12, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County) (Special Term rejected Board of Trustees requirement that petitioner
show a single, discrete accident which resulted in the loss of hearing), citing Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 76 A.D.2d 1043, 429 N.Y.S.2d 339
(1st Dep't 1980). Similarly, the Beekman ruling may affect O'Hagan v. Board of
Trustees of The New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, N.Y.L.J., December
1, 1978, at 6, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), remanded, 72 A.D.2d 501, 420
N.Y.S.2d 391 (1st Dep't 1979), remanded after hearing, 80 A.D.2d 506, 435
N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st Dep't 1981), republished, 439 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1st Dep't 1981), order
resettled, 81 A.D.2d 818, -.N.Y.S.2d - (1st Dep't 1981). In another post-Beekman
ruling, however, the appellate division reversed the granting of an accident disability
pension. Duester v. McGuire, 81 A.D.2d 553, 438 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1st Dep't 1981). It
found that the Medical Board made no findings concerning the heart condition and
remanded for reconsideration. The lower court had erred when it granted the
pension as such power resides in the Board of Trustees and cannot be assumed by the
court. Id., citing Meschino v. Lowery, 34 A.D.2d 255, 310 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1st Dep't
1970), modified, 31 N.Y.2d 772, 290 N.E.2d 825, 338 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1972).
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a bar.1 49 The court held that the police officer had acted in the line of
duty because he was protecting his partner and "in an effort to carry
out the statutory purpose and implement public policy the courts have
held that there is a presumption that the police officer's disability had
been accidental for purposes of line-of-duty pension benefits." 50 Finally, the Beekman appellate division decision 15' was cited when a
science teacher applied for accidental disability benefits after developing a heart condition which he claimed resulted from almost twenty
52
years of exposure to chemicals. 1
It is clear that the Beekman ruling has had implications for nonheart related disabilities, and may be applied to an even wider range
of physical or perhaps psychological disabilities. This is a result of the
court's expansive definition of accident, which will undoubtedly have
an impact on future decisions in both public and private sector pension and worker's compensation cases.
IV. Effect of Judicial Decisions
One consequence of the Beekman decision and subsequent lower
court cases is that costs will continue at the same, or possibly greater
rate, than in prior years. In 1979 the City Heart Bill was estimated as
costing taxpayers $12.3 million per year, greater than what it would
have cost had union members received ordinary disability pensions. 153 The Mayor's Management Advisory Board estimated in 1976
that pension costs could be reduced by $17 million per year over a
54
period of time if the heart disease presumptions were eliminated.'

149. Breslin v. New York City Police Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, N.Y.L.J.,
October 13, 1981, at 14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
150. Id.
151. Gatto v. Board of Trustees of The New York City Teachers' Retirement Sys.,
N.Y.L.J., January 8, 1981, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), citing Uniformed
Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. Beekman, 76 A.D.2d 1043, 429 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st
Dep't 1980), for the proposition that an accidental disability need not arise in a
sudden, unexpected or out-of-the-ordinary occurrence. This decision was later affirmed by the court of appeals, 52 N.Y.2d 463, 420 N.E.2d 938, 438 N.Y.S.2d 746
(1981).
152. Justice Greenfield denied petitioner's motion, stating that while an accidental disability need not arise in a sudden, unexpected or out-of-the-ordinary occurrence, petitioner would have to demonstrate that the Medical Board's determination
was not "arbitrary and capricious." Id., citing Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local
94 v. Beekman, 104 Misc. 2d 829, 838, affd, 76 A.D.2d 1043, 429 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st
Dep't 1980).
153. Memorandum from Jonathan Schwartz, Chief Actuary, to Philip R. Michael, First Deputy Commissioner, N.Y.C. Dep't of Investigation (April 29, 1979).
154. Report of the Mayor's Management Advisory Board ("Shinn Commission")
(April, 1976).
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The Beekman decision also may favorably influence the passage of
new legislation. Two bills were introduced during the 1981 legislative
session-one would provide the addition of language, identical to the
"Lung Bill" 155 presumption for firemen,156 to the city's Administrative
Code-the other would establish the City Heart Bill as permanent
legislation.157 This second bill has been proposed and rejected several
times in previous years. In light of a strong judicial affirmation,
however, state legislators may believe that this is an appropriate time
to codify the bill.
In view of the court of appeals ruling on the City Heart Bill, the
city may choose one or more courses of action should it adhere to its
anti-heart bill position. The approach which would probably be most
successful is a serious attempt to rebut the dual presumptions read into
the statute. The burden is upon the city to present substantial evidence to overcome the statute's rebuttable presumptions. 158 While
most states do not provide examples of successful rebuttal methods,
there is an entire body of case law which has developed under the
State Heart Bill, where the State Comptroller did gather sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumptions of line-of-duty and accident causation. 159 These state cases could be scrutinized for specific factors,
including medical evidence of pre-existing or pre-disposing health and
heart problems, high risk factors such as smoking, obesity or congenital conditions, and evidence that there was either no accident or that
the injury involved ordinary work performance.

155. The so-called "Lung Bill" of 1969 provides for firemen and their widows
rebuttable presumptions concerning job-related diseases of the lung. NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, § B19-7.84.1 (1976):
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Code to the contrary, any
condition of impairment of health caused by diseases of the lung, resulting
in total or partial disability or death to a member of the uniformed force,
who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into the service of
such department, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such
condition, shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence. (Added by 1969 N.Y. Laws, ch. 1106.)
The Lung Bill has been construed and applied to extend its rebuttable presumption to
all aspects of the proof requisite for a line-of-duty accidental disability pension. The
Uniformed Firefighters Association has urged that the City Heart Bill's rebuttable
presumption be similarly extended to all elements of proof regarding heart disabilities.
156. S. 4277 (A. 5829-A), proposed March 3, 1981.
157. S. 4279 (A. 5830), proposed March 3, 1981.
158. See note 7 supra.
159. J. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 58 (10th ed. 1974); 4 BENDER'S NEW YORK EviDENCE § 230.04 (1980); see notes 52, 58-59 supra.
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The city also might consider a change in the procedures governing
pension administration. It could allocate to medical boards a greater
responsibility for seeking facts to rebut the heart bill's presumptions.
It could establish, for example, personnel units whose primary function would be to investigate heart bill case histories. At a salary of
$15,000-20,000 per year, 160 with five investigators assigned to the
Police and Fire Departments, the combined salaries of approximately
$90,000 would be less than the amount they could ultimately save the
city by reducing the number of accident disability pensions granted
instead of ordinary disability payments.' 6 ' To complement this
change, another procedure could be implemented by the city to save
time and money spent on judicial proceedings initiated when pension
applications are rejected or appealed. A body of hearing officers could
be appointed to review appeals from the Pension Board decisions prior
to, or in place of, full-scale mandamus or declaratory judgment proceedings under Article 78.162 This would resolve cases at an earlier
stage.
Finally, the city might bring lawsuits challenging the statute on
state or federal constitutional grounds. In one state it was held that a
special firefighter heart bill was unconstitutional as class legislation. 6 3 The statute, which made heart disabilities occupational diseases in the case of fire department members, was held to have
created special substantial benefits to be paid from the public treasury
under the guise of the worker's compensation law. 16 4 The statute
violated a North Carolina constitutional provision against special
emoluments and privileges, and furthermore, consisted of benefits not
accorded to other municipal employees or the general public.16 5 Similar challenges might be made in state or federal court under the New
York State constitutional prohibitions against gifts or loans of state
credit, money or property,16 6 or under its equal protection provision.1 7 It is unlikely, however, that either challenge would be suc-

160. For information on New York City civil service job titles and salaries, see
generally The Civil Service Leader and The Chief (weekly newspapers).
161. See note 153 supra.
162. N.Y. Civ. PRnc. Art. 78 (McKinney 1981).
163. 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22 (1951), But see City & Co. of San Francisco v.
WCAB, 22 Cal. 3d 103, 583 P.2d 151, 148 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1978); Grover v. Town of
Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 357 A.2d 922, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975).
164. Id. at 92, 66 S.E.2d at 26.
165. Id.
166. N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8, art. 8, § 1.
167. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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cessful. Statutes believed to be "class legislation" have frequently
survived challenge because New York courts have adopted the federal
approach of analyzing equal protection issues: 168 different treatment
of persons similarly situated may be justified if reasonably related to
an appropriate government interest." 9 A statute is presumptively
valid and will not be disturbed unless it is without a reasonable
relation to a valid state purpose when neither fundamental rights nor
suspect classifications are involved. 70 Supporters of the City Heart
Bill argue that it is justified in terms of maintaining adequate police
and fire protection, and would prevail over attempts to show that
other city workers deserve increased pension benefits due to stressful
occupations or a high incidence of heart problems.
The statute might be attacked on due process grounds.' 7' For
example, in one case 172 a heart bill that established a conclusive
presumption 173 was found to have violated the due process clause of
both the state 74 and federal 175 constitution. The Workmen's Compensation commissioners had refused the city's offer to show that claimant's heart attack did not arise out of his employment and was due to
systemic health conditions. 176 While conclusive presumptions have

168. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978);
Rasmussen v. Toia, 420 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jeffery v. Malcolm, 353 F.
Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Image Carrier Corp. v. Beame, 430 F. Supp. 579
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979);
Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afJ'd, 393 U.S. 323 (1969).
169. See, e.g., Alma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
School Crossing Guards Ass'n of City of New York, Inc. v. Beame, 438 F. Supp. 1275
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Muessman v. Ward, 95 Misc. 2d 478, 408 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1978); Cooper v. Morin, 91 Misc. 2d 302, 398 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1977); People v. Holbrook Transp. Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 650, 378
N.Y.S.2d 939, appeal dismissed, 88 Misc. 2d 80, 389 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976).
170. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Gregory v.
City of New York, 346 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Cen., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
172. Ducharme v. City of Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 285 A.2d 318 (1971) (statute
establishing conclusive presumption concerning heart disease connection to employment violated due process clauses of both state and federal constitutions); but see
Colgan v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Md. App. 331, 320 A.2d 82 (1974), aff'd,
274 Md. 193, 334 A.2d 89 (1975) (special statutes regarding heart cases were not
unconstitutional as to alleged "irrebutable presumptions," due process or equal protection issues).
173. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
174. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
175. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
176. 161 Conn. at 143, 285 A.2d at 322.
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been struck down by the United States Supreme Court in the civil
context where they conflict with the due process or equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 7 7 the Court has recently shown
reluctance to overturn conclusive presumptions where a statutory
classification was reasonably based. 178 This trend highlights the difficulties inherent in bringing constitutional challenges involving conclusive presumptions.
The city would face a similar problem if it were to argue that the
heart bill violates "state action" principles. If the unions' Pension
Boards of Trustees, who are public officers, were to veto a city resolution to return a case to the Medical Board for further investigation or
analysis, they would be acting "under color of state authority."1 79
Such a veto might be sufficient to give the city standing to argue a
state action claim, for municipal corporations have been held to be
"persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.1 80
Yet
the rights violated may, in fact, be the very ones noted above: a veto
would effectively turn a rebuttable presumption into a conclusive
presumption, which would be difficult to persuade a court to overturn.
V. Conclusion
Many states have enacted heart bill legislation granting high pension benefits to police officers and firefighters suffering from heart
conditions. In New York, judicial decisions reflect what appears to be
the concern of the legislature that there is a connection between the
high-stress nature of police and firefighting work and heart conditions.' 8 ' New York legislators have not adequately reviewed the ra177. See Vlandies v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (when a presumption is not
necessarily true in fact and when the state has reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination, an individual must be afforded an opportunity to
rebut the presumption). See also Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See generally Note: The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?72 MICH. L. REV. 800.(1974).
178. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975).
179. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
180. Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir.
1968); see also City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 675 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 422 F. Supp. 676, 682 (D.C. Md. 1976).
181. At the floor debate of the N.Y. State Senate in 1979, the following comments
were made by State Senator Mendez:
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tionale of a dual line-of-duty and accident presumption. This was
clear when the City Heart Bill was debated in 1979, and state senators
expressed their desire to reward those who risk their lives daily in the
performance of duty. 82 In effect, emotional issues relating to the
dangers of crime and fire have attained more prominence than the
distinctions between accident causality and non-work related heart
problems. 18 3 As long as the sentiment supporting high pension
awards for those engaged in police and fire service exists, it will be
extremely difficult for state and municipal governments to eliminate
or reduce the impact of heart bill legislation.
Andrea J. Berger

One day I saw a big fire being put out in my neighborhood .. .so I saw
the stress and the smoke and everything . . . .I think that if a person is
doing that kind of job for years eventually something's got to give. The
stress is tremendous . . . .I can't conceive of a cop walking the streets in
the City of New York without having his eyes in back of his head, without
worrying constantly all day long if somebody's going to pull a gun on him
or try to attack him . ..and if a cop has to go out on beat with those
feelings of stress and strain and worry and concern . ..over a period of
time . . . it's going to have a toll on him . . . and I think that you yourself
know that one of the causal factors of heart attacks and heart conditions is
stress and strain and worry ....
Transcript, supra note 1, at 4968, 4975.
182. At the debate, several senators expressed distrust and disdain for testimony by
noted heart specialists concerning the lack of evidence linking police and fire work to
heart problems. Transcript, supra note 1, at 4947, 4954-56, 4960, 4962-63.
183. State Senator Mauriello's comments were representative of the consensus of a
majority of legislators in attendance.
The police and firemen of this state, admittedly we've given them somewhat preferential treatment. Well, darned well we should. We've given
them laws and we've given them problems that they can't handle, and
maybe we ought to give them something, something in return for the jobs
that they do, not only in upstate but in New York City, where we've given
them three times as much murder, made a target out of them, police and
firemen.
Id. at 4948-49. It was noted in the course of the debate that deskbound police officers
and firefighters are also covered by the law. Id.at 4925.

